

1103. g.  $\frac{1312}{3}$



THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL  
QUERIST,  
CONTAINING  
THE SENTIMENTS  
OF AN  
IMPARTIAL ENGLISHMAN.



[ Price One Shilling and Six Pence. ]

Q U E S T I O N S



THE SEVENTH EDITION

OF

IMPARTIAL ENGLISHMAN

BY THE REV. J. H. STODOLSKY

[The Original and First Edition]

Q

I

The

I

RE

G

fin

Print

715

THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL  
QUERIST,

CONTAINING

THE SENTIMENTS

OF AN

IMPARTIAL ENGLISHMAN

ON

The Present Rupture with SPAIN,

ITS POLITICAL STATE,

INTERNAL WEAKNESS,

AND

Best METHOD of attacking her.

Interpersed with

REFLECTIONS on the Importance of *Minorca*,  
*Gibraltar*, *Corfica*, *Guadaloup*, *Canada*, *Louisiana*, *Martinico*, &c. &c. &c.

---

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for W. NICOLL, at the Paper-Mill, St. Paul's  
Church-Yard. 1762.

# THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST

CONTAINING  
THE SENTIMENTS

OF AN

IMPARTIAL ENGLISHMAN

ON

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE



ITS POLITICAL STATE

INTERNAL WEAKNESS

AND

THE MEANS OF REMEDY

By  
J. B. M. H. N. O. N.

REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND  
THE NECESSITY OF REFORMING THE  
PRESENT STATE OF THE

LONDON:

Printed for W. Nicol, at the Paper-Mill, St. Paul's  
Church-Yard, 1832.



THE

Constitutional QUERIST.

**L**ET us not enter into unnecessary details; why must ten pages be filled with the reasons of my submitting my thoughts to the public judgment? A preface is not always necessary; in this case less so than ordinary, for with what could I fill it but an account of myself? and what satisfaction would that be to a sensible reader? The Utile shall be contained in a small compass.

Know then, courteous Reader, that the Author of these sheets is an Englishman, perfectly detached from all party; he loves his King much, but his country more; his religion is that by law established, yet is he

B not

not so bigotted to it as to hate any kind of Dissenter merely for being so : he has even been known to converse, I had almost said cultivate, a friendship with a professed Papist : he joins in opinion with another who says, that *An honest Man's the noblest work of God* ; he carries not his religion constantly in his mouth, nor is his loyalty so suspicious as to need continual boasts : as a friend to his country, he watches the measures that are taken for its security, some of which he approves of, others discommends, without regard to the persons who were the authors of them ; impartiality is one of his darling attributes ; he judges not of the wisdom of a man by the event of any enterprise he might have planned ; many things are necessary to ensure success ; the hand that executes must be as faithful to its duty as the head that forms the measures to be taken ; let the Minister be ever so able, if the Admiral or General he chuses be not brave, generous, vigilant, and honest, what are we to expect, but that our hopes will be defeated ?

What is the opinion of the rational part of the nation respecting this new War with Spain ?

The

The trade that is carried on between England and Spain is of pretty near equal benefit to both nations; perhaps the ballance may be somewhat in our favour, but that is rather of service to them, to whom bullion is a mere commodity; as much an article of trade as woollen or linnen cloths are with us. This to some may appear strange, yet is strictly true; for suppose any King of Spain should take it into his head to forbid the exportation of gold from any part of his dominions, and that measures were accordingly taken so as absolutely to prevent its being exported; the natural consequence would be, that gold would in a little time become a mere drug there in comparison to its present value; for the bullion from time to time imported from their settlements in South America, is much more than sufficient to supply a necessary quantity of coin for the circulation of that kingdom. If it were all to be coined, either the surplus must lie idle in the King's treasury, or being so plentiful, the price of commodities of all kinds would rise in proportion; so that though the King of Spain might then boast of the quantity of coin that was continually circulating in his kingdom, yet would the intrinsic value of the whole be no more than it is at this day; besides that, his subjects would thereby

be deprived of many necessities and comforts of life, with which they are now supplied, for a small proportion of that gold which cannot be of any use to them when kept at home.

One would be tempted at first thought to imagine, that, when two nations find nearly an equal benefit in the trade that is carried on between them, means might be found to keep them in constant peace: but we must remember that Kings are men, and men have passions; we must not also be unmindful that a Prince of the house of Bourbon, to whom ambition is hereditary, now wears the crown of Castile. It is not every man that can bear the smiles of Fortune. Whilst he reigned a petty sovereign of a small Island, he carried himself so as not to be thought turbulent; he was well respected in Europe, and generally esteemed a Prince who governed with proper moderation; his power and consequence in the scale certainly were not great, yet was he happy in possessing the good opinion of a great part of Europe. The throne of Spain became vacant, when England, at all times fond of generous actions, afforded him that security in his passage to his capital, which his new acquired kingdoms and far extended power could not procure him.

him. The air of Madrid, and the adulation of the grandees, taught this Monarch to think himself of consequence; he was informed there were some matters in dispute unsettled between England and Spain, should not then the natural consciousness of the dignity of his station have prompted him to employ his own Ambassador, a man of consequence and quality, in this important affair, whereon it depended, whether it should be peace or war? Or if this Monarch had any objection to the person who represented him at this court, should he not in pride and in prudence have sent over some other person charged with that particular commission? But this he did not. Monsieur Bussy, a French agent, was the man he chose for the purpose; thereby lessening his own consequence, and insulting the dignity of a British Monarch. Such a step as this must necessarily cause a jealousy between the two courts; the Castilian Monarch, who might have begun his reign by an honourable mediation, so far forgot the character, as rather to lose himself in the opinion of mankind, than not shew his partiality to his cousin of France.

At this juncture, a man, great in integrity as well as knowledge and power, had intelligence of the Bourbon family-compact: he knew



knew it was contrary to the interests of his country, he did his duty in communicating this knowledge to his Sovereign in council; he acted the part of an Englishman in giving the advice he did, tho' it was over-ruled by so great a majority; and he proved himself a man of spirit and prudence, by declining an employment necessarily exposed to envy, and in the execution of which he must at that juncture be of course blamed for omissions which in truth could not consistently with justice be laid to his charge. That the categorical answer was not demanded by an Admiral Ambassador, at the head of a royal fleet, was not his fault; the lower tier of a first rate could have declared war as effectually as the procession of heralds from the Royal Palace to the Royal Exchange. *Ultima ratio regum* is no improper motto, and the *ultima ratio* should be its own messenger. When they felt themselves wounded, they would have known they had enemies, and instantly reflecting on their past conduct, could not have been at a loss by what name to call them. Unhappy for us, we missed the lucky minute; time turned aside his forelock, and the galleons, we in all probability had it in our power to have intercepted, thro' the dalliance of some, got safe to their wished-for port. Then was the mask thrown aside; the gent-

left

left appellatives for the British nation were proud, haughty, imperious, and overbearing ; a coup d'eclat on our part might probably have prevented a new war from breaking out in Europe.

When matters were in this situation, it was time for our Sovereign to vindicate his own honour, and that of the nation, which ought always to be closely connected ; war was declared, and we are embarked in the sea of discord. Feuds and quarrels with other nations are certainly, if possible, to be avoided ; prudence will direct us to chuse the lesser evil, and war should never be preferred, but when peace can no longer be preserved, consistently with the safety, interests, and honour of the nation.

Let me speak the sentiments of my countrymen, in wishing we may speedily have a good peace ; but then it must be made with prudence, caution, and foresight. If it is to last only a few years, it will be of little service ; the last peace is a sufficient evidence of this truth, without any comments. We feel to this day the consequences of our folly ; and the Americans, I mean our brethren who live on that continent, have reason to curse the hour in which the peace was signed, without

out the limits of our plantations being first settled. We are now, I hope, a wiser nation; the French are driven from Louisburg and Canada, and will, it is to be hoped, soon be made to evacuate Louisiana. Till we are in possession of this province, we have done nothing; for while the French preserve any footing in North America, our colonies will never be secure from invasion and depredation. Some persons, perhaps agents to France, affect to treat the reduction of this colony as a matter not worth our attempting; they say it is in a weak condition, and is not capable of doing us the least injury. But let us not be deceived by such specious pretences; it is much stronger than we imagine, and the French inhabitants much more numerous; the country is a perfect garden, the soil beyond expression fruitful, watered by many fine navigable rivers; the air is salubrious; and the trade far from contemptible; for such is the commendable industry of the French, that, taking the benefit of the rivers, they have intercourse with nations of Indians, whose very names our colonists are strangers to.

Louisiana comprehends a large extent of country; it reaches to the back of several of our valuable colonies, which are thereby subject to inroads whenever the French find a proper

proper opportunity of making them. Their intercourse with the Spaniards in Florida is frequent, and it is not to be doubted but they would be greatly assisted by them was there any enterprize in agitation.

If the attack of Louisiana is deferred, Georgia may soon be lost to us, and the commendable labours of the indefatigable and public-spirited Oglethorpe be laid level with the dust. Should Georgia be once in their possession, they would have a firm footing, the Carolinas and Virginia would be in danger, and we should find it much more difficult to dislodge them from thence than we did from Canada.

Cape Breton was last war taken by our gallant Colonists, and at the peace was restored by our long-headed politicians; we have seen the error of the step, and if we fall again into the like mistake, shall merit the contempt and laughter of all Europe. It is to be hoped, however, we are not always to be the dupes of our enemies.

A good peace is to be wished for, a peace that will secure our independency as a nation, a peace whereby our trade shall be protected in its increase, a peace that shall be  
 C settled

settled with such deliberation and caution, as to be likely to last till we can, out of the savings of the revenues and taxes, pay a part of that immense debt with which we are now oppressed. If we cannot obtain such a peace, the war had much better be continued for some time longer. God has hitherto fought our battles, we have had all the success we could wish for, and our French enemies are tolerably humbled; if their spirits are somewhat raised by the accession of their new ally, it is incumbent on us not to be dejected. Let us place our hope in the God of Armies, and he will not desert us; but we must endeavour to merit his protection, by being virtuous as a people; let our hope be still placed in him, yet let us not be wanting to ourselves; a vigorous and due exertion of that superiority which all Europe knows we are possessed of as a naval power, must in a short time humble our new, but haughty enemies. Descents on their coasts would much more avail us than any we can make on those of France; we might not only land in Spain with much less difficulty, but make our landing good, and, if it were thought necessary, make the heart of their country the seat of the war. The Spaniards are not, as a nation, now so formidable as they once were in Europe; the

system



system of policy by which the kingdom is governed is, and has of a long time been had; their internal strength is inconsiderable, and only dreaded because seen at a distance; their King is but new among them; the Spaniards have a natural dislike to the Italian manners, but more particularly to an Italian favourite. Were we early in the summer to land, on any part of their coast which is farthest distant from France, with a strong body of men, their loyalty would be staggered, especially if we could play the old game of sending thither a pretender to their crown. The Spaniards are so jealous a nation, that they would not permit a French army to cross their country to relieve them: they would in the first place be too proud to think they wanted assistance; and, in the next place, the French are the last they would wish to receive it from; for, though it may not be generally known in England, there is a natural antipathy between the two nations.

The descent here proposed must not be looked on as an ideal scheme; experience has taught us it is practicable, at least our fathers remember with pleasure the gallant actions of the great Earl of Peterborough; but it is with a mixture of sorrow, when they recollect and tell their attentive sons,

that these eminent services were afterwards neglected, and left totally unrewarded, in so much that the man who so well deserved, and so long enjoyed the admiration and esteem of his countrymen, was received with manifest coldness whenever he approached the court. By this great and fortunate General are we instructed in the manner we should attack the Spaniards; and I have so good an opinion of some who are honoured with, and do honour to the King's commission, as to believe that it would be no very difficult matter to find a man every way capable of conducting such an enterprise, perhaps with success almost equal to that of the noble Earl I have already mentioned. Though the success were not near so great, it would still answer the purpose of greatly distressing our enemies.

Spain is an extensive kingdom; but it is far from being populous, great part of the country is a desert, and an incredible number of young men, who might be useful, either in cultivating or defending their country, daily take the vows, and spend their after-lives in convents. Spain by this means is, as it were, a nation of Religious; and its internal strength, which, as I said before, is at best but small, decreases in the same proportion

portion the Monks and Friars encrease. It will perhaps appear strange to some of my countrymen to be assured, that the number of these drones in Spain amounts to some hundred thousands; the monasteries swarm with them, and the whole country is spotted like a leopard's skin with monasteries and convents; in effect so little subject are they to temporal jurisdiction, that they may be termed the Pope's train-bands. To this cause may it be ascribed, that many of the inland provinces of Spain are in a manner desolated for want of cultivation; the whole kingdom does not afford corn enough to supply the inhabitants with bread: if they till their lands, it is by halves, consequently it must yield but a small encrease; those that live in the convents are supported by large revenues annexed to them; very many who have not taken any vow are too proud to work, and the few who would be industrious are too much oppressed to earn any more than what will scantily maintain their families. Can then a kingdom in this situation boast of its internal strength? Surely not. Contrary to the case of most other nations, it is less in their power to support a war at home than in any other part of the world. This is owing to their poverty in men, and riches in treasure. On their frontiers, or in an enemy's

my's country, they can and do constantly employ many mercenaries; but their jealousy and pride will not suffer them to do this at home in any numbers. We cannot have a greater instance of their sensible want of men, than the high premiums they now offer to all foreign seamen who will enter into their pay and service; yet even by this do they find it a great difficulty to man their considerable fleet; inconsiderable, I mean, when compared to that which is to dispute with them the dominion of the sea.

We cannot deny but that the Spaniards have generally great personal courage; they have on many occasions given proofs of it, and it is not a very great while since the Spanish infantry was esteemed the steadiest and best the world afforded. They are not now so sunk in reputation as to be despised as an enemy, yet have we it in our power, by taking proper measures, to manifest to them the superiority we are possessed of in the contest that is now begun between the two nations.

I could perhaps tell my reader in what particular place and province the Spaniards might be thus internally attacked to advantage; but that might possibly be a means of impeding the success of it, should such an enterprise

terprise ever be carried into execution ; as doubtless, tho' they are generally weak, did they conceive in what place they were particularly so, some kind of remedy, by way of prevention, would be of course applied. The immensity of expence may possibly be urged as an argument against the undertaking ; but I am apt to think that a much less sum than has been employed in the expedition against Martinico would procure us, if properly and prudently expended, a good peace with Spain, within a year from this time. It is rather a war with the court than the nation ; the Spaniards are in general averse to it, conscious of the comforts they enjoy by a free intercourse of trade with the British dominions.

If the bulk of the people are sick of a war, it is indeed very difficult for even an absolute Sovereign to carry it on.

Nothing could have tempted his late Sicilian, but now Catholic Majesty, to give occasion for a rupture between the two nations, but a vain imagination his Italian favourite had formed, that our credit was near exhausted by the length and expence of our war with France ; yet perhaps to his cost he may find, that we have not only funds sufficient to carry on the war for a much longer time, but public



lic spirit to contribute a large share of our wealth to defend the honour and interests of our country from being injured, and by that means secure to ourselves a lasting peace.

Is not the hiring a large number of German officers, a sign that the genius of the present race of Spaniards is no ways turned to war ? Or perhaps it may be suggested, that the Spanish Monarch is but little disposed to put an entire confidence in the loyalty of his new subjects, therefore means that the principal commands in his army shall be trusted to foreigners. Let which will be the case, it urges us to a vigorous exertion of that power our superiority at sea gives us over them : they are already in fear for Cadiz, and making the necessary provisions for its defence in case of an attack ; but Cadiz is not the weakest part of their dominions ; we may find other places for our enterprise, where there will be a much greater probability of success.

This is the manner in which we ought to make war with the Spaniards, if we would wish to distress them, regard being had still to preserve the manifest superiority we have acquired at sea ; yet let us not imagine this is the only way we can with advantage attack them.

them. To take the Panama from them, is far from being an impracticable attempt: if that were in our possession, our brethren the Scotch might with safety plant a colony on the isthmus of Darien, from which they were suffered to be so injuriously driven. We should there discover a new channel of trade, that would be a means of employing and enriching thousands of our countrymen, and perhaps come in for a share of that wealth which alone preserves Spain from being the contempt of all the nations of Europe.

A small squadron of ships was last war sent into the South-Seas, to cruise against the Spaniards; the fitting out these ships cost the nation a large sum of money, yet were they not well supplied either with men or stores. Great matters were expected from this expedition; but it turned to little more account than to keep the people some years in suspense, to know what was become of them; and in the end, after the ruin of the fleet, and the loss of many hundreds of excellent seamen, it enriched, by a lucky capture, a few, perhaps some of them undeserving particulars; yet were such an expedition now on foot, it need only be well fitted out and equipped, and the command given to a man

D

of

of spirit, as well as prudence, to ensure all the wished-for success.

I commend caution, circumspection, and foresight, in a commander in chief, both by sea and land; yet something else is to be expected from the first, besides preserving the King's ships, and the lives of the men; and the last will not be commended, if his skill consisted only in keeping the enemy at bay, without either gaining or losing any advantage. If that were the system by which all commanders should square their conduct, a war might be protracted so as to last a century at least, if the nations engaged in it were not in a much shorter time ruined by the expence. A war had always best be brisk and vigorous, but of short continuance, and in every military exploit something should still be left to fortune. Of what use else would be that courage for which our seamen are so famed? If they were never suffered to fight but when certain of success, what necessity would there be for that ardour for the combat, which displays itself so conspicuously in a British fleet, formed in a line of battle? If our gallant seamen are at such times sanguine in their hopes of success, it is not on the number of their ships, or their weight of metal, they depend, but

but on that natural courage with which they find themselves inspired. And great pity it is, that the caution of any commander should check that ardour, which has acquired and confirmed to us the absolute dominion of the sea.

A late unfortunate commander imagined he met with an unmerited fate, because tho' his fleet exceeded that of the enemy in number of ships, yet in guns and in weight of metal he was rather exceeded by them. On these occasions we should not make too much use of our knowledge in arithmetic. Highly commendable was that answer of one of our ancestors, who, when he was asked how many the enemy were in number? said, There were of them enough to kill, enough to make prisoners, and enough to run away. There was a time when it would have been esteemed a piece of madness to approach a fort with a man of war; but Blake had spirit enough to teach his countrymen a new lesson, which his successors have not a little improved, insomuch that a man of war is now capable of lying within half a mile of a fort or less, and returning it at least shot for shot. *Fortuna fortes adjuvat*, Fortune favours the courageous.

Minorca, say they, is to be, or is already given up to the Spaniards, the French there-

by putting it out of their power to restore it to us on a peace. This is by some particulars looked upon as a sorrowful circumstance; they foretel, with very grave faces, the ruin of all our trade in the Mediterranean, adding, that the harbour of Mahon is, past expression, excellent; that it was a ready and safe retreat for our men of war cruising in those seas, and an effectual curb to the French subjects fitting out any privateers from the coasts of Provence. But why should we be downcast at so inconsiderable an event? why will our trade up the Streights be therefore ruined? This does not appear to me to be the probable consequence; better, in my humble opinion, give up ten Minorcas than one Canada; our fleets, with which we can at any time, with the will of God, command success, can procure safety to our merchants trading to the Levant; but of what use is all our naval power to cover the frontiers of our numerous colonies in North America, in case the French should again be put in possession of Canada? We have severely felt the power they would have of molesting us, and it is certainly our fault if we again give them an opportunity of doing it: on the contrary, *Delen-da est Carthago*. Louisiana must be taken from them, or all we have done will be to little purpose.

Let



Let this be established as a fixed and unalterable truth, Whilst the French have a foot of land left on the continent of North America, the back-settlers in our colonies will be continually subject to scalpings, ravages, depredations, and ruin. The French have not only ambition, but an industry that amazes; particulars of them are indefatigable in promoting the interests and honour of their mother country. Perhaps the means they use are not always laudable; but if a deviation from the straight line of justice is ever excusable, it must be in men who are tempted by the notions they form of public spirit to err, reaping themselves no manner of advantage from the conduct they pursue. It is this spirit in the French colonists that made them so powerful in Canada; it is this made us, at the beginning of the war, when our counsels were unprosperous, almost tremble for the fate of some of our colonies; and this it was that made the conquest of a province, in itself inconsiderable, be deemed a mighty acquisition; and such it is indeed, if we consider the security it does and will give to our good brethren the inhabitants of America. Let us hope, that no man will so far deserve the curses of posterity as to advise the restoring Canada to the French. It cost us dear in the  
loss

loss we had of Wolfe ; let us therefore at least value it as the price of his blood.

As to the consequence of Minorca, it must be owned, that the harbour of Mahon is good, and a proper and convenient resort for the King's ships stationed to protect our trade in those seas ; but will not the Island of Corsica be of nearly the same use to us, and answer in most respects the same purposes as Minorca ? Do we owe any tendernefs to the Genoese, who have, during the whole war, supplied our enemies with ships, men, and military stores ? Would it not be a piece of generosity worthy the English nation, to succour a distressed people, who grasp at liberty, and would be glad to have it confirmed to them by the protection of so powerful a friend ? Would not the defence of the island of Corsica cost us a mere trifle, as the inhabitants having once tasted of uninterrupted liberty, would strenuously join with us in opposing any bold invader ?

By the public accounts may be seen what an immense sum of money it annually cost the nation to support Minorca. The keeping up several regiments, particularly for its defence, was the least part of it ; even the article of transport-service was not a trifle ; and all

all this, because there was very little dependance to be placed on the fidelity of the inhabitants. Is not then the island of Corsica much more proper for a place of arms in that part of the world than Mahon?

It costs us a great deal to support a garrison at Gibraltar, but that is a place really important; it secures a pass of great consequence, no less than that to the Mediterranean, and all parts of the Levant. Were it not for this fortress, either our trade to those parts would be precarious, or we must constantly keep some stout ships cruising at the mouth of the Straights, which could not be a very agreeable station, as they would be destitute of a convenient harbour to retire to in cases of necessity; and perhaps even the Corsairs of Barbary would form an imagination they might insult us, in the same manner they at present do most of the powers of Europe.

Some, who think themselves wise, are apt to say, We are on the eve of losing Gibraltar, for that the Spaniards are marching a powerful body of men to besiege it by land, and the combined fleets of France and Spain are in the interim to block it up by sea. I will not deny but that the Spaniards have it at most

most times in their power to invest it by land, and that the combined fleet may block it up by sea : But is our garrison therefore immediately to take a panic, and surrender at discretion ? Are we to suppose that the persons entrusted to lay out the public money appropriated for its support, are such traitors as to have been deficient in their care of repairing the fortifications, &c ? It is true, some complaints were made by a late unfortunate admiral sent to the relief of Mahon ; but certainly all matters then complained of have been set right, and not neglected, merely because *he* said, that an inspection was necessary, and that his fleet was but badly accommodated when it put in there on its voyage.

We call ourselves, and all Europe acknowledges us to be, sovereigns of the sea ; what then should we have to fear from any naval armament it is in the power of the French and Spaniards to make ? Should their combined fleet block up Gibraltar for a time, it would indeed be unfortunate, if we could not dispute with them their station, and throw into the place what succours we pleased, of men, ammunition and provision. The world in general knows the place to be very strong and well-fortified ; it is therefore most probable, that the besiegers would be tired of their

their attempt long before they could have any hopes of succeeding in it, and this must of course be the case, unless there were treason, cowardice, or ignorance, either in the sea or land commanders. It is with pleasure I say, that such has been the late behaviour of our officers in both elements, that we have no reason to suspect them on any future important occasion in which their country may demand their faithful services. If our military attempts in general succeed not, it is more owing to the misapplication of the public money than any other cause.

Great complaints have been made of the scarcity of men to recruit our land-forces; the officers on that service give seven and eight guineas, sometimes more, for a man. But is not this a want created by our own folly? Both the Spaniards and French have several Scotch and Irish regiments, which are generally esteemed at least as good as any in their service. These regiments are, as opportunities offer, recruited from among the Roman Catholics of his Majesty's dominions, and the officers are constantly Scotch or Irish, very few English engaging in the service. Would it not then be worth attempting to supply the want we are in of men, and distress our enemies? This might  
E easily



easily be done, by raising eight or ten thousand men, and forming them into regiments, which should consist, both officers and men, of nothing but Papists; every particular should take all the necessary oaths, but that of supremacy, which should be dispensed with.

Many will, doubtless, exclaim at this proposal, as favouring of Jacobitism, and apprehend that such a body of men, acting in concert, might effect a revolution in favour of the Pretender: but such timorous wretches should be laughed at with contempt for their ignorance; we are not now, thank God, in fear of any thing the Pretender or his few adherents can do. Jacobitism is in a manner extirpated from the three kingdoms, and a Papist and a Jacobite are far from being synonymous terms. A Papist may be loyal as well as honest, and most of them have at this day sense enough to distinguish, that they cannot be happier than they are under the present government, as they are secure in their property, and free from persecution. His late Majesty, in the years 45 and 46, acknowledged he owed much to the loyalty of many of that persuasion, some of whom in that time of confusion did him and the nation important services.

The

The advantages accruing to officers on our establishment are much greater than what are met with in France. I have conversed with many gentlemen who have served in the Scotch and Irish regiments in France and Spain, who almost to a man assured me, that nothing would be a greater comfort and satisfaction to them, than to have a door opened for them to engage in the British army, without being obliged to take the oath of supremacy, which was against their conscience. As to the oaths of allegiance, they had no objection to them, confessing these kingdoms could not be happier than under the present administration. This they assured me was the opinion of most of their comrades. They are in general good officers, and men of strict honour; and I dare venture to affirm, that all of them that engage in our service would behave with spirit, resolution, and fidelity. The cause in which their fathers engaged is grown desperate; they have sense enough to know it, and would be glad of an opportunity of avoiding the many slights they from time to time receive from the court of France: besides, let what will be said, every man must have a natural partiality for the country that gave him birth.

Were the regiments I have been mentioning permitted to be raised, the necessary number of men might be procured with great ease, and officers properly qualified would not long be wanting. Our Ministry are not at a loss to know in what manner safely to employ them, as they would not wish to shun danger ; but rather grasp at all opportunities of convincing their countrymen they were worthy to be trusted.

Much clamours has been raised about the importance of Guadaloup ; arguments without number have been used to prove its utility, and how necessary and proper it would be to keep it in our possession on a peace ; whilst others, on the contrary, argue that it would be of no manner of use, and therefore proper to restore it to France.

If the possession of Guadaloup would secure to us the whole sugar-trade, I would by all means advise the keeping it ; but as the case stands, it would in truth be of little service to us. We do not find that the price of sugar is at all lessened by what is imported from thence ; a few powerful and rich planters and factors can, at any time, raise it or fall it as they please : they govern the markets, by taking care not to supply them with more  
than

than will sell at their own price. As sugar is, since the introduction of tea, become as it were one of the necessities of life, the consumers must be supplied ; and, if they cannot have it at a reasonable rate, they must be content to give more than it is worth. It is for fear the markets should be overstocked, that much fine land in the island of Jamaica is left entirely uncultivated ; if all the land fit to bear canes was planted, the produce in sugar would be three times as great as it is, and the country ten times more healthy ; for it is a thing observable in those hotter climates, that the less woody, and the more populous and improved the islands are, the less subject are they to diseases, and the ordinary mortality.

It may possibly be objected, that if Jamaica were improved in the manner here proposed, and actually did produce treble what it now does, yet such increase would be useless, as the markets would be overstocked, we being already supplied with as much as is necessary. But this I deny ; for the increase of the produce would lessen the price, which would of course increase the consumption of the commodity ; and if it should prove after all, that the growth of canes was greater than we could dispense with in sugar, all that was  
to

to spare, after plentifully supplying the markets, might be converted into good and wholesome rum, which would be a saving to the nation of a very large annual sum now sent to France for brandy.

Notwithstanding I have asserted that the growth of sugar-canes should be increased, yet it is no argument for our keeping Guadaloup: the French set a high value on that Island, and the Neutral islands are full as proper for our people to cultivate, plant, and improve; and they would not be backward in doing it, were proper encouragement given them by the public for that purpose.

It may by some be urged, that we ought to keep Guadaloup, if it were only because it is of such value to the French; but that is arguing from false principles. Such objectors must certainly be ignorant why the French value it, they think perchance it is because they can grow no canes at all if they are deprived of it. But this can never be the case, as whoever knows any thing of the West Indies can inform these over-wise Gentlemen, that the French need not be at a loss where to fix their settlers, as there are many places, yet unclaimed and uncultivated, very proper for the purpose of raising canes; and the



the value they set on the island in question, proceeds from their subjects having formed a regular settlement there, and being already furnished with the necessary conveniences for grinding the canes, and boiling and making the sugars. Conscious, therefore, that the cession of it to us would be a great loss to the inhabitants, they would on that account wish to avoid it : but should we insist on too much in exchange for it, and by that means not restore it, we should soon see another French sugar-colony rise, as it were, out of the sea, and be speedily as flourishing as that was when we took it ; for the French nation, to do them justice, are possessed of a very commendable industry, a crime our planters in that part of the world cannot in general be charged with.

We have been promiscuously informed of a very large naval armament, consisting of at least forty sail of Spanish men of war, now lying at the Havannah : these, it is suggested, are destined for the conquest of Jamaica ; but does not this story at first sight plainly appear to be a fiction, calculated to serve a purpose ? The price of sugar is lately risen, the purpose is thereby served, and the authentic intelligence will of course soon be forgot. But were not they in a manner infatuated,

tuated, who could give credit to a piece of news so replete with improbabilities? In the first place, it is very much to be doubted, whether the Spaniards have at this time forty men of war compleatly fitted out and ready for sailing; and if they have, it is very improbable that all, or even a fourth part of them, should be in America. If they are any where to be met with, it is certainly in the Spanish ports in Europe. But even suppose they had a strong fleet at the Havannah, and well equipped, is this a proper time for them to meditate an attack on Jamaica, when we have so superior a fleet in the West Indies? Jamaica would not perhaps prove so easy a conquest as some of my countrymen are fond of reporting: it might last war have been attacked with a much greater probability of success; but it is not now so defenceless, owing to the attention, care, oeconomy and superior skill of a late governor of the island; yet was this man treated with as much disrespect, as if he had not put them in a condition to defend themselves in case of an attack; such is the happy spirit of liberty conspicuous in the dominions of Great Britain.

I must once more resume the subject of the causes that preceded the rupture between Great Britain and Spain. It must be allowe

ed

ed, that the Spanish court has been notoriously partial to the French nation during the whole war. One instance, among many, was their behaviour in the affair of the French East Indiaman, taken by the Antigallican privateer; perhaps it had been better for the nation, if our court had behaved with more spirit on the occasion; but that is past recall. It was certainly without precedent, that, at such a juncture, an agent from France should be chosen as the channel through which to convey Spanish grievances. His Catholic Majesty's ministry well knew our court would take umbrage at it; a pretext had been long, though secretly, sought to break with us; and as to the articles with which Mons. Bussy was charged on the behalf of Spain, they were pretensions hatched on the occasion.

They consisted of three several demands.

First, That we should restore all prizes taken under Spanish colours, during the present war.

Secondly, That the Biscayans and Guipuscoans should have liberty to fish for cod on the banks of Newfoundland.

F

And,

And, thirdly, That all our log-wood cutters should immediately quit their present settlements.

Though the Spaniards themselves well know the unreasonableness of these demands, it will not be amiss to say a few words relative to them.

With respect to the first article, I believe I may venture to affirm, that there have been no illegal captures made on the Spanish subjects ; if any of their ships have been sent into our ports by our cruisers, and the cargoes condemned, it has always been satisfactorily proved they were the actual property of the French King's subjects. We might as well not declare war, if we suffered the enemy's trade to be carried on in any neutral bottoms whatever ; but the grand objection to be made to this demand is, that if any of the prizes above-mentioned were in truth illegal, it was always in their power to prove it in the courts appointed by the legislature to try processes of that kind ; and if they thought any injustice was done them, there was still a liberty to appeal : by this means, if they could make it appear, that the cargo was not counterband, they were sure of having it restored with costs. This was the natural course of justice ;  
but



but this was not the manner they chose to proceed, thinking, perhaps, to gain that at a critical juncture by clamour, which a regular enquiry would by no means give them.

Their second demand, of liberty to fish for bacalao or cod on the banks of Newfoundland, is still more unreasonable. They say they have always claimed that right; but are they on that account ever to have it granted to them? They might as well demand liberty to buy wool in the fleece, that they might manufacture all their own cloths. The fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland ought certainly to be appropriated to our sole use; the island was first discovered at our expence, and we have ever since been in possession of it. Salted cod are become, as it were, one of our staple commodities; we supply many parts of Europe with it, and Spain in particular takes a great many quintals annually off our hands, besides what is used in our home consumption. The Newfoundland fishery is likewise on all hands acknowledged to be a great nursery for thousands of excellent, able, and hardy seamen; should we then be little less than madmen to extend to other nations a trade that is of so much real importance to the well-being of our navy, and the mercantile interest of the kingdom? Certainly we

F 2

should;



should ; and perhaps, were we as national as we ought to be, neither a Dutch nor a French ship would ever be permitted to approach those coasts.

The Spaniards will not on any account permit his Majesty's subjects to trade with their settlements in South America ; why then should they be suffered to incroach on what may be very properly called the British gold mines ? I hope, and I speak the sentiments of every friend to his country, that the Spaniards may never be permitted to approach our fisheries.

The third article, the Spaniards empowered Mons. Buffy to demand, was, that the settlers in the bays of Honduras and Campeachy, and on the Rio Pinto, should immediately quit their habitations, and desist from cutting any more logwood there, or in any part of the Spanish dominions. In return for this concession, the King of Spain had promised that England should not want a supply of logwood, and afterwards took great offence that his Britannic Majesty should require to know in what manner the English subjects were to be supplied with it, and what security he was to expect that such supply should not be wanting.

It

It would be giving up a great deal to relinquish our settlements on those coasts on any account; what right the Spaniards have to demand it, is not easily accounted for. It is very certain the English are the only nation that ever were settled in that particular part of the continent of America; the Spaniards cannot possibly have any claim, unless, from having first discovered one part of South America, they lay an undistinguished claim to the whole, and comprehend what places they please within that general name: had not the subjects of England settled themselves in the bays of Campeachy and Honduras, they would in all probability have been uninhabited to this time, so little did the Spaniards know of the coast, or of the nature and value of its natural produce. Let us not therefore give the power of supplying ourselves with this useful commodity out of our own hands; why must we depend on the honour of any monarch whatever for the enjoyment of that benefit of which we can at all times command the possession? It is to be hoped, whenever a peace is concluded with Spain, that the right of the British nation to those settlements, may be acknowledged in so full a form, that no dispute may hereafter arise, relative to the title we assert we have to a quiet enjoyment of them.

We

We will now take a step, and see what is doing in the northern parts of Europe. It is but lately that Russia and Sweden were declared enemies of Prussia; the former a powerful empire, and able to find employment for the greatest part of the Prussian forces. As to Sweden, it does not bear the reputation it did under Charles the Twelfth; their military character is quite lost; so far from being formidable, they are a divided people, and the contempt even of their enemies. They have made a paltry figure in the present war, and were the last people his Prussian Majesty ever thought of providing himself against. It was a faction drove them into the war, the King and the people are entirely averse to it; and as the faction that prevailed at the declaration is now less powerful, the nation will of course be wise enough to get the best peace they can.

The empire of Russia is the most rising power in Europe; how great must their consequence in the scale appear, if we compare them to what they were sixty and seventy years ago? We now see them internally powerful, their troops are numerous, good, and well-disciplined; their navy respectable; their trade advances every day, owing to the great

great encouragement it meets with ; the manners of the people are more polished, and their sentiments, without comparison, more refined than they were at the beginning of the present century ; in fact, they are in every respect quite a different nation.

Alexander conquered many rude, unpolished, or effeminate nations ; and was therefore called the Great. Julius Cæsar enslaved his country, and was saluted Imperator. Augustus, to confirm himself in his Uncle's throne by proscription, cut off the flower of the Roman nobility ; yet these were great men among the ancients. And what can we say of the modern hero, Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, but that he was a mere Almanzor, more fool-hardy than truly brave ; more successful than politic ; an enemy to the true interest of his country ; cruel by nature ; a slave to his passions ; obstinate in his pursuits, and romantically fond of bloodshed and slaughter : in fine, he was the most troublesome of neighbours ; and it was the qualities I have described, that caused his long imprisonment at Bender, and in the end his own destruction, and almost that of his country, which he left surrounded with enemies, and to the last degree impoverished ; insomuch that it has been ever since



since of very little weight in the scale of Europe.

Let us now turn our eyes on Peter the Great, the never-to-be-forgotten father of the Russian people. Had he lived in the first ages of the world, the gratitude of his subjects had certainly ranked him with the Gods. How seldom do we find the character of a great warrior joined to that of an excellent lawgiver? Where is now in Europe a Sovereign, who would himself, as well by example as precept, take the trouble of instructing his people? A set of men not docile and willing to learn, but obstinately set against innovations, and superstitiously attached to their old, though ridiculous, customs. This did Peter attempt; this did God permit him to live to see accomplished. He taught those the use of navigation who knew not what a ship was, by which means he soon saw himself master of a fleet of stout ships. His army, which was raw and undisciplined, and that by choice and custom, he new-modelled, thereby making himself formidable as a Sovereign. In a military capacity and genius few excelled him; in a civil, none. He seems indeed altogether superior to almost all the great men of ancient and modern history; but it is with pleasure



I say, that our own nation has afforded a man, from whose model Peter might have formed himself, and have been just what he was; so great was the simularity of their characters. The Hero I mean, is Alfred the Great: let my readers search into the small remains we have of his history, and my assertion will be found to have very good foundation.

The Russians are now a formidable nation; and have perhaps in the course of this war done Prussia more real injury than her inveterate enemy the Empress Queen. The death of the Czarina has given a great turn to the affairs of Germany; but my countrymen are always apt to be too sanguine in their hopes, as well as sometimes too prompt in their fears. No sooner did the news come of the present Emperor's accession to the throne of his ancestors, but our coffee-house politicians not only restored peace between the courts of Russia and Prussia, but gave us the agreeable account that the Russian army was to join the Prussians, and drive the Empress Queen from her capital of Vienna. An order that hostilities against the Prussians should cease, and that part of the army should forthwith march back to Petersburg, confirmed our gentlemen in their opinion. But

G

, why

why must we dive so deeply into the secrets of Princes, and with so little foundation? Cannot many reasons be assigned for the Emperor of Russia's conduct, without driving him instantly to declare war against his predecessor's ally? May we not naturally suppose, as many of his opinions were previously known, that he apprehended some attempts against his crown by the adherents of the late Empress Anne, and the French party at Petersburg? Was it not therefore prudent in him to treat with Prussia, that he might withdraw some of his best regiments, to secure his seat in the throne? Let us look at matters in this light, and all his conduct appears uniform and consistent. If he makes a reasonable peace with the King of Prussia, it is as much as we can desire or hope for, and will, it is presumed, be of great effect towards bringing about a general pacification; for the Empress will not chuse to carry on the contention with the King of Prussia, when he has his hands at full liberty, and can turn all his forces against her. He may perhaps be permitted still to keep his darling Silesia, and both parties contentedly set down with the expences and losses of the war. If this should be the case, the French have no longer business in the empire, and we might withdraw all our forces from

Germany,

Germany, and either employ them to much greater advantage against our enemies, or, what would be more for the interest of England, disband them, and thereby annually save some millions to the nation.

Denmark is arming; great are the doubts respecting the occasion of it: some think to dispute with Russia the duchy of Holstein; but it is, with more probability, only to secure his own dominions from attack, which they might otherwise be subject to in the confusion that now reigns in Europe, by the war's being become almost general. Denmark has troublesome and restless neighbours, and ought therefore always to be in some sort provided against any sudden occasion.

How unhappy is the present condition of Poland, owing to the internal divisions that reign there? She is subject to the insults of every proud invader. Large bodies move slowly; the kingdom might be half over-run and impoverished before the diet could assemble to provide for its defence. They guard so much against the incroachments of the royal prerogative, that they leave many doors open for the incursions of their enemies: the Crown-General is scarcely less than a sovereign, and the power of the nobility so great,

that the crown of Poland is little more to be considered than a feather in the Monarch's cap. The Russians have lately made as free with the Polish dominions as they could have done with their own, by marching through them with their troops, and forming magazines where-ever they pleased. Thus is a kingdom, able to raise and maintain at least 200,000 men, subject to continual insults, and all owing to a defect in the constitution of the government. They call themselves a free people; yet none enjoy freedom but the noblesse, who are little less than sovereign princes on their own estates, the peasants of Poland being the most abject slaves in Europe. Nothing perhaps will bring them to their former consequence, but a war with the Turks; which, if it should happen, would rouse them from their lethargy, restore to them the knowledge of their internal strength, and probably convince them how inconsistent it is with their interest or safety, so much to curtail the power of their Kings.

God send we may soon see a conclusion to this long, expensive, and troublesome war. One would almost imagine the different powers of Europe had made an agreement among themselves, not to permit the world to enjoy for seven years successively peace and tran-

tranquillity. If, after a tedious war, there is a treaty, the matters in dispute are generally in a great measure left undetermined, that a door may more easily be found for a new quarrel. Formerly one, or perhaps two general battles, would end a dispute; now whole campaigns pass sometimes almost without a skirmish. The art of war is reduced to a regular science: if a General is capable of acting on the defensive against the enemy, he is dried up as a great man; a second Fabius. What was formerly called magnanimity, is now esteemed rashness: every General is not a Peterborough, nor every Admiral a Blake. Many who think themselves possessed of great political abilities, have clamoured, that the articles of the next treaty with France ought, for the nation's greater security, to be settled in the House of Commons, and have pretended we shall by that means have a peace to the general satisfaction of all degrees of people.

I must beg leave to differ in opinion from these able Gentlemen, and that for several reasons.

First, It is undoubtedly a branch of the Royal prerogative, to make war and peace,

Secondly,



Secondly, Tho' all the members of the honest house of Commons are men, and good Britons, they may not all prove wise.

Thirdly, Such a procedure would occasion very long and unnecessary delays.

Fourthly, It would be too great an addition to the power of that Honourable House.

Fifthly, France would not, in all probability, chuse to treat in that manner, by which means peace might be postponed.

Sixthly and lastly, The House of Commons themselves have doubtless so good an opinion, and approve so much of our happy constitution, as by law established, that they would not wish for a change in any part of it, though it should increase their own power.

Why should we desire to deprive his Majesty of any part of his royal prerogative? The executive power should always be in the hands of the crown; no good Englishman would, I dare say, desire the King of Great Britain to be in the same condition of restraint as his Swedish Majesty now is; yet such would nearly be the case, if the power of making peace and war were taken from the crown. If we

we would wish to continue a free people, we must support the dignity and consequence of our Kings. Denmark has afforded us an example of what is in the power of the bulk of a nation to do, if they think their liberty, and the common rights they ought to enjoy with the rest of mankind, invaded, and find their King by a defect in the laws unable to relieve them. Let us then be content with our present state of government, which all Europe acknowledges to be most excellent. In treating with an enemy, there are many things, which ought at least during the negotiation to be kept secret. I acknowledge, that every member of the House is in the strictest sense of the word honest, and a true friend to his country; no view of interest could prompt any of them to vote against their consciences in favour of the enemy. French gold would lose its accustomed power, were it offered to any of our representatives; but tho' they have without doubt all of them good hearts, it is no reason but what some of them may not have quite so good heads. I never yet heard that a good understanding was a necessary qualification for a man to sit in that honourable assembly; we may therefore safely say, they are not, as particulars, all wise; and if so, the one who is deficient, may very innocently speak that without the house,  
which

which ought not to be uttered but in St. Stephen's chapel. In fact, the house of Commons is not a place to transact an affair that requires secrecy. Another objection is, that as every article of the treaty must or at least should be debated in a full house, if it is debated there at all, the delays that would thereby be occasioned are inconceivable ; so as, in my opinion, to render it almost an impracticable attempt. To have the house of Commons interfere improperly in making a peace, would be a very dangerous precedent ; some future assembly might expect to have the power of making war likewise, and if that were to happen, we need not say who would be kings of England. And besides all this, it is much to be doubted, whether the King of France would treat in this manner. Kings are accustomed to adjust those matters with Kings, without their subjects interfering, unless by a subsequent approbation. I am far from standing up for any thing that in the least tends to give the King an absolute power over his subjects ; yet should I be almost as unwilling that he should be retrenched in any article of power he now possesses. The several parts of the Royal prerogative are certainly the most beautiful gems of the crown ; they make our King respected abroad, and support his dignity and consequence at home. We cannot

not take away one of these gems without sullying all that remain ; a vacuum would too plainly appear, and the beautiful regularity of their disposition be entirely spoilt : but there is in truth little occasion to make use of any arguments in this matter ; for the gentlemen that compose that honourable assembly are too much friends to their country, to wish it should come before them. They are well acquainted with the excellence of our present happy constitution, and know that the power annexed to the three branches of the government is truly proportioned to what each requires to make the nation happy. Why should we imagine they wish such an encrease in their power, as might in the end prove destructive to their being as a parliament, as well as to the liberties of the whole nation ?

We are told that the Spaniards threaten to invade Portugal, if it does not declare in their favour ; and that a large body of forces are ordered by his Catholic Majesty, to march to the frontiers for that purpose. Most probably this enterprise will not be carried into execution, at least, for the present ; but if his most Faithful Majesty's dominions should be invaded, it is certainly incumbent on us to give him a powerful assistance. Spain has

H long

long looked on Portugal with a very 'jealous eye ; she esteems it still as a rebellious province, that has shaken off the yoke of its lawful Sovereign. The court of Spain cannot with sincerity allow the house of Braganza to have any title to that crown, and has, of a long time, only waited for a proper opportunity to declare publicly its sentiments on that head. It is not very improbable, but in the Bourbon family-compact there was a secret article, whereby France engaged to assist Spain in annexing the kingdom of Portugal to the Castilian crown. This appears the more likely to be the case, by the rumour spread immediately after the declaration of war with Spain, that Portugal was to be invaded by them : and this seems indeed at first to have been their intention ; and if their sentiments are in that respect altered, it is perhaps owing to their finding themselves not quite in a condition to be so formidable as they expected.

His Catholic Majesty, had he acted with common prudence, might certainly, with great propriety, have taken on himself the title of general mediator of the peace of Europe. This would indeed have been an honour to him ; but the natural partiality he had to his cousin of France must shew itself on all  
oc-



occasions, by which he made himself unfit for the character of mediator, where impartiality is the first requisite. He has now drawn on himself a truly formidable enemy; for I may venture to say, Britain was never so powerful, or esteemed of such consequence in Europe, as she is at this time. The little trade which was seen stirring in the Spanish ports, must of course be ruined in a short space of time; and notwithstanding their being, as some of my countrymen have been pleased to say, possessed of so numerous and strong a fleet, they will for the future find it a very difficult matter to get home their Plate and register ships; and if these fail them, they must of necessity soon make peace with us on our own terms; for the Spaniards are not, as I have already said, supported by their internal consequence, strength and riches: their treasury is in the Indies, and it is after many months hazard that it comes to be of any use to them. Should the Spaniards, however, keep to their first resolution of invading Portugal, (for I will not imagine this last kingdom can be so blind to its interests as to declare in their favour against England) considering the advantages that accrue to both nations from the trade that is carried on between Lisbon and London, we ought for our own sakes to do all we reasonably can to pro-

tect them from so near an enemy. Perhaps we could not find a much better way of carrying on a land war with Spain, than in conjunction with his Portuguese Majesty. Portugal is rich in bullion, and it would be a great increase to the trade of this kingdom, were we, on such an occasion, to supply them with all their arms, ammunition and military stores; and it would be well worth their while to buy them of the English, as they could not at home make them either so expeditiously or so cheap. We have before now maintained an army to great advantage in Portugal, and many at present in this city have in their youth served there. Spain is only strong on the frontiers of Portugal, when compared with the enemy they have there to cope with; but were the Portuguese joined by a strong body of English forces, the difficulties they would have to encounter in entering Spain on that side, would not be very formidable; and when they were once entered, it would be far from impossible, to make the enemy's country the seat of the war as long as it lasted. This would be attacking them in a tender part; for, as I have said before, the Spaniards are by no means in a condition to support a war carried on in the bowels of their kingdom. The answer the King of Portugal is said lately to have given the Spanish court

court, is spirited and proper. The Castilian Monarch desired to know what part Portugal intended to take in the new war? To this his Most Faithful Majesty replied, " That " he had no cause of quarrel either with " Spain or England, therefore intended to " preserve a strict neutrality ; consequently " his ports would be open both to English " and Spanish ships, provided they conform- " ed to the proper laws and customs : but " that if either power attempted to inroach " on his rights of sovereignty, by obliging " him to depart from the neutrality he would " wish to preserve, he should repel force by " force, and appeal to all Europe for the in- " justice that was done him." This was an answer worthy a wise King, as his Majesty of Portugal is said to be : he wishes not to involve his subjects in a war which they would not be well able alone to support, and is of opinion, that nothing but a just cause ought to prompt him to declare war against the neighbouring states.

If, after all, Spain should attack the Portuguese, it is certainly incumbent on us to afford them all possible assistance. The Spaniards will make their being partial to the English a pretence for the quarrel, and it can never be for the interest of Portugal to be at variance with

with us, as the trade she carries on with Great Britain is of more real consequence and advantage to her, than what she has with the world besides. This the King of Portugal is very sensible of, this it is that makes him cautious of giving the English cause of offence, this it is, that makes the Spaniards meditate an attack on his dominions. The consumption of British manufactures in the kingdom of Portugal is indeed great, particularly in the woollen way, insomuch, that, notwithstanding the immense quantity of wines we annually import from thence, the ballance of trade is very considerably in our favour; and what makes it more particularly advantageous to us is, that it is chiefly carried on in British bottoms, consequently must be a nursery for a number of good seamen. On these accounts it is well worth while for the Portuguese to stand the attack of Spain, rather than lose their trade with England; and, on the other hand, Great Britain cannot do better than by affording them assistance; protect Portugal against her old, and perhaps, still implacable enemies. This will, I venture to say, be our scheme of policy, and by this means we may with all probability soon reduce our new, but haughty enemies.

Gauda-

Guadaloup has been some time conquered, and Martinico is of late added to the British dominions: But will the great increase which these conquests ought to occasion in the import of sugars, lessen its price? No; for, since we have been in possession of Guadaloup, sugars are much dearer than they were. Who then enjoy the benefit of this acquiescence of dominions? We cannot say the public; because, besides paying a number of new taxes to support the expence of the expeditions, we now give a large advance in price for sugar, which is almost become one of the necessaries of life, so frequent is its use, and this notwithstanding the number of our sugar-plantations must be by these conquests so much increased. If these islands are intended to be given up when we have a peace, it is perhaps no bad policy to keep up the sugar in this manner; for it might be of troublesome consequence, were the public made acquainted at how cheap a rate they might be supplied with that useful commodity. I have been credibly informed, that great quantities of French sugars have been imported into London as the produce of our own islands. The French planters, say they, sell much cheaper than ours; therefore the adventurers in that branch of trade have a large and certain profit. Need we then wonder that the  
French



French sugar islands were in a flourishing state, when they could find an English market for their staple commodity? But is it not a shameful inattention in some persons of other in power, that the best and richest lands in some of our islands should be monopolised and kept uncultivated by an inconsiderable number of rich Planters? Should not greater encouragement be given to new settlers, and such Proprietors as have more land than they can cultivate, be obliged to let it at a moderate quit-rent? Might not the number of sugar-works in our islands be to great national advantage encreased? Would not the temperature of the air in the islands be much altered for the better, were the lands more cultivated and improved? I know it will be urged, that it would be an encroachment on the liberty of the subject, to oblige any one to let lands they chuse to keep in their own hand: but the good of particulars is always to give way to the good of the public in general. Monopolies are never encouraged in a well-regulated commonwealth; why then should this, which is so grand a species of monopoly, be permitted to exist? We are every day enclosing our common lands and waste grounds in England, to the evident loss of many poor cottagers, and some of the yeomanry who are owners of

of small plots of ground, and thereby entitled to an extensive right of commonage. Is not the liberty and property of these men full as precious to them as the liberty and property of any rich Planter whatever? Many reasons might be alledged in favour of these new sugar-works proposed to be made in our islands; but can we mention any thing that will convince us of the necessity of this measure, more than the state in which Martinico was found when our troops took possession of it? It is notorious, there was scarcely any sugars to be met with on the island. This was not owing to any hurricane or bad seasons; neither did the Dutch buy them up; for St. Eustatia was likewise quite bare of this commodity; and we very well know, little or no sugar got last year to France from that island: what then are we to conclude? May we not venture to say, that the whole last year's produce found its way to an English market; perhaps by the way of Guadaloup? Is it not a known fact, that we have for many years past taken off annually a great quantity of the French sugars? If the demand at the English market is so great, and increases daily, as in truth it does, would it not be a great saving to the nation, were we entirely supplied with that commodity by the increased produce of our own islands?

I

Might

Might not the neutral islands be planted, if good ground were wanting? Ought we not to do our utmost to prevent the ballance in trade being so great in favour of France, as in time of peace in truth it is? Have we not great reason to think it is the trade carried on with British subjects, that has made the French sugar-islands be now in so flourishing a state? Did we ever, till the breaking out of this war, think either Guadaloup or Martinico worth attacking? Was it not in general imagined till lately, that the French sugar-trade was trifling, and of little consequence? Has not that trade, and the Newfoundland fishery, been the chief nurseries to supply their navy with seamen? As the consumption of sugar in France is small, would not their settlements of course decline, were we wholly to supply ourselves with that useful commodity? If land were wanting in the West Indies, do we not know that sugar might to great advantage be made in our most southern colonies of America, was the planting of canes there properly encouraged? If some sugar was made in North America, would it not, without any other compulsion, oblige our sugar-planters in their own defence to cultivate all the land they have proper for their purpose? This is not invading either their liberties or properties, neither

neither would they have any right to complain. I shall defer saying more on this subject till another opportunity : What I have already said is to be looked upon rather as scattered sentiments, than digested ideas ; rather a conveyance of the thoughts of very many of my honest countrymen, than an opposition to any particular system or scheme of government. The arguments are drawn either from known facts, or probable conjectures ; and if all do not think with me, still they ought not to condemn me. It is the duty of every member of a commonwealth to propose any thing he imagines may tend to promote the national interest, and leave it to those who are acquainted with the secret springs of government, to chuse whatever is most convenient and proper for the present juncture. This has been my principal motive in publishing this tract. If any of the hints are adopted by those in power, and should succeed, I shall be much pleased, and enjoy an inward satisfaction that cannot easily be equalled. Who would not wish to have it in his power to serve his country ?

F I N I S.



21417



